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Abstract
Environmental adversity is associated with a wide range of biological outcomes and behav-
iors that seem to fulfill a need to favor immediate over long-term benefits. Adversity is also
associated with decreased investment in cooperation, which is defined as a long-term strat-
egy. Beyond establishing the correlation between adversity and cooperation, the channel
through which this relationship arises remains unclear. We propose that this relationship is
mediated by a present bias at the psychological level, which is embodied in the reproduc-
tion-maintenance trade-off at the biological level. We report two pre-registered studies
applying structural equation models to test this relationship on large-scale datasets (the
European Values Study and the World Values Survey). The present study replicates exist-
ing research linking adverse environments (both in childhood and in adulthood) with
decreased investment in adult cooperation and finds that this association is indeed medi-
ated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off.
1. Introduction
Environmental adversity is often conceptualized as the product of two different dimensions:
harshness (i.e., externally caused levels of morbidity-mortality that an individual cannot con-
trol) and unpredictability (i.e., spatial-temporal variation in harshness) [1]. In humans, adver-
sity is closely aligned with economic deprivation and resource scarcity [2–4] and is commonly
associated with a wide range of detrimental biological outcomes and behaviors, ranging from
reduced lifespan [5], detrimental health behaviors [6–10], suboptimal financial decisions or
lower education [11–17]. Adversity has also been targeted as a potential candidate causing var-
iability in a number of social behaviors seemingly unrelated to those mentioned above, such as
social preferences [18–21], social learning biases [22–26], social trust [27–29] and cooperation
[30]. However, whether cooperation is decreased or increased in adverse environments is still
debated.
In theory, the relationship between environmental adversity and cooperation could go
either way [30]. On the one hand, adverse environments might be associated with increased
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cooperation as a means to mitigate direct survival threats, such as pooling material resources
to reduce the impact of external events like famine [31,32]. On the other hand, adverse envi-
ronments might be associated with decreased cooperation because adversity constrains people
to focus on trying to meet their individual needs [30].
Whether adverse environments are associated with decreased or increased cooperation
seems particularly influenced by the way cooperation is measured. The main distinction is
between self-reported questionnaires and field experiments on the one hand and behavioral
experiments (i.e., economic games) on the other hand. Self-reported measures of cooperation
and economic games differ in several important ways: (1) self-reports are more influenced by
social desirability bias, (2) they are based on people’s limited insight on their own behavior
and (3) self-reports are based on attitudes while economic games are based on actual behavior.
It is important to note that some of the studies cited as support for the association between
adverse environments and increased cooperation [31,32] use agent-based models, which are
distinct from self-reported measures, field experiments and behavioral experiments.
The existing empirical evidence is currently inconclusive. When cooperation is measured
via self-reported questionnaires or in field experiments, studies usually report an association
between adverse environments and decreased cooperation. Notably, Korndörfer et al. [33] and
Schmukle et al. [34] found a negative correlation between lower social class and cooperative
behaviors (e.g., donating, volunteering, helping) using questionnaire data from large and rep-
resentative international samples (average N over 9 studies = 20.243). Using field experiments,
Andreoni et al. [35] and Nettle et al. [36] also found that lower social class correlates with
decreased cooperation.
When cooperation is measured using behavioral experiments (i.e., economic games and
actual behavior in various settings under scrutiny of the experimenter), the results are much
more mixed. Some studies report an association between adverse environments and decreased
cooperation [33,34,36–38], but other studies find the opposite pattern [39–41] or no effect at
all [42,43].
The reason why these behavioral experiments give mixed results is unclear, but several
explanations have been put forward. First, some of these studies have small sample sizes,
which may explain, for example, why Piff et al. [41], who found a positive relation between
environmental adversity and cooperation, was not replicated in a high-powered pre-registered
study [42]. Second, these studies usually only use one economic game, which may lower their
generalizability [44]. In accordance with this idea, McAuliffe et al. [45] found that single eco-
nomic games do not correlate with real-life cooperation, but a general factor based on several
economic games does. Finally, there is increasing evidence that economic games lack ecologi-
cal validity [46].
Beyond establishing the correlation between adversity and cooperation, the channel
through which this relationship arises also remains unclear. In a large review paper, Pepper
and Nettle [47] put forward the idea that there might be a common origin to the constellation
of behaviors observed in adverse environments, which is that they reflect a contextually appro-
priate need to favor immediate over long-term benefits. Recent studies indeed reveal that peo-
ple living in adverse conditions prefer immediate rewards over delayed rewards, discount
future rewards more, are more pessimistic about their future, and are more impulsive than
those living in more affluent conditions [48–53]. In sum, people’s living environment appears
to affect the present-future trade-off, with adverse conditions promoting present-oriented
behaviors, and affluent conditions promoting future-oriented behaviors.
Evolutionary models [54,55] and empirical evidence [56–60] suggest that variations in
cooperation might also depend on variations in the present-future trade-off, and ultimately on
the environmental factors that shape it. Cooperation is defined as “a behavior that provides a
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benefit to another individual (recipient), and the evolution of which has been dependent on its
beneficial effect for the recipient” [61,62]. Cooperation has two subcategories: altruistic and
mutually beneficial behaviors [62]. We are particularly interested in mutually beneficial coop-
erative behaviors, where the actor incurs immediate costs and the benefits are delayed. In this
framework, cooperation is a future-oriented strategy [63,64]: in the short term, it is more
advantageous to reap immediate, smaller, but more certain benefits by cooperating less but in
the long term, it is more advantageous to invest in large-scale cooperation so as to reap longer-
term benefits such as increased social reputation.
The way the present-future trade-off is instantiated at the psychological level might partly
result from how it is embodied at the biological level [47,65], notably through the way organ-
isms optimally allocate their limited stock of energy between reproductive goals and mainte-
nance goals [1,65–68]. Similarly to the present-future trade-off observed at the psychological
level, the shape of the reproduction-maintenance trade-off is partly conditioned by the envi-
ronment, and therefore subjected to plasticity during an individual’s life. In line with this phe-
notypic plasticity perspective, correlational research in humans living in industrial and post-
industrial societies suggests that experiencing adversity during childhood accelerates repro-
duction while decreasing investment in health [69–71]. By contrast, safe childhood conditions
are associated with delayed reproduction [1,66,72–75] and are negatively associated with a
number of morbidity risks [76]. In sum, prioritizing reproduction is classically viewed as a
present-oriented life-history strategy because it comes with direct and indirect survival costs
that might otherwise be minimized by delaying reproduction. The reason is that adverse con-
ditions make life uncertain, so that one cannot be sure that an investment made in the present
(e.g., health efforts) will pay-off in the future (e.g., living longer). Counteracting these risks
requires prioritizing immediate but certain benefits (i.e., reproduction) at the expense of long-
term but uncertain benefits (i.e., somatic investments and health) [77–80].
Taken together, these observations raise the possibility that the effect of environmental
adversity on cooperation might be conditional on the shape of the reproduction-maintenance
trade-off. More specifically, individuals who experienced environmental adversity–both dur-
ing childhood and adulthood–might invest less in cooperative activities, and this effect might
be conditioned at least partly on the priority they give to reproduction at the expense of health.
Decreasing the costs of cooperative interactions might be contextually adaptive in the most
deprived societies where social trust is lower and interpersonal violence is higher, and where
people feel more exposed to risks of exploitation outside their kinship network [81–83].
In this paper, we test the relationship between childhood and current environmental adver-
sity and people’s propensity to invest in collective actions, which we use as a proxy for coopera-
tion. Collective action can indeed be defined as “multiple individuals pay the cost of
contributing to a group project and share in the resulting benefit” [84,85]. We further test the
hypothesis that the relationship between adversity and collective action is conditional on an
individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off. Our specific hypotheses were that (1) child-
hood environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions, and
that this effect is mediated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off;
(2) current environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions,
and that this effect is mediated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-
off.
To test these hypotheses we applied multivariate models (structural equation modeling) on
two independent datasets containing information about the values, the beliefs and the behav-
iors of more than 295.000 participants representative of more than 100 countries all over the
world (the European Values Study and the World Values Survey). The robustness of the mod-
els was assessed by employing a discovery/ replication procedure. First, each dataset was
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randomly split into two subsamples of similar size: a discovery sample and a replication sam-
ple. Second, the discovery sample was used to design and test the model. We then pre-regis-
tered the analysis plan in the Open Science Framework. Finally, the replication sample was
used to check the robustness of the model. The present study replicates existing research link-
ing adverse environments in childhood and adulthood with decreased investment in adult
cooperation [33,34,36–38], and finds that this association is mediated by variations in individ-
uals’ reproduction-maintenance-trade-off. Furthermore, it adds to the consistent pattern of
results (i.e., a relationship between adverse environments and decreased cooperation) found
by existing studies that use self-reported questionnaires to measure cooperation [33,34].
2. Study 1: Childhood adversity and collective action in the
European Values Study
We tested the association between childhood environmental adversity, the reproduction-
maintenance trade-off and adult investment in collective actions by applying structural equa-
tion modeling on the European Values Study dataset [86]. The European Values Study has
relied on social scientists since 1981 to collect data from large representative samples of the
populations from 47 European countries. In this study, we used the fourth wave of the survey
for which data was collected between 2008 and 2010. We focused on the fourth wave because it
includes the same collective action variables as the World Values Survey, which gives us the
opportunity to replicate our initial findings on an independent sample.
2.1 Methods
2.1.1 Respondents. 66.281 respondents living in 46 different countries are included in
wave 4 of the European Values Study. However, some respondents could not be included in
our analyses. Two of the variables used to model the reproduction-maintenance trade-off were
only relevant for respondents with children, which led us to focus on the 45.624 respondents
who report having children. We randomly split this sample into a discovery subsample (22.570
respondents) and a replication subsample (23.054 respondents). In both subsamples, we
excluded respondents with too much missing data (the criterion was set to more than two
standard deviations from a respondent’s respective subsample mean) which led to 20.755
respondents for the discovery sample and 21.156 respondents for the replication sample. The
final discovery sample after listwise deletions included 16.790 respondents (females: N = 9.837;
mean age = 52 ± 15 sd; mean number of respondents per country = 382 ± 126 sd) and the final
replication sample after listwise deletions included 17.087 respondents (females: N = 9.957;
mean age = 52 ± 15 sd; mean number of respondents per country = 380 ± 136 sd). The final
replication sample after listwise deletions consists of 45 countries (descriptive statistics for
each country are detailed in S1 Table).
2.1.2 Variables. We selected variables tapping three constructs: childhood environmental
adversity, the reproduction-maintenance trade-off and collective action. Childhood environ-
mental adversity was modeled as a formative latent variable including the following items:
“death of the father before age 16” (scale 0–1), “death of the mother before age 16” (scale 0–1),
“parental education” (scale 1–8: the higher the score the lower the educational level of the
parents), “parents had problems replacing things” (scale 1–4: the higher the score the more dif-
ficulty replacing things) and “parents had problems making ends meet” (scale 1–4: the higher
the score the more difficulty making ends meet). Based on the recommendations of Brumbach
et al. [69], childhood environmental adversity was modeled as a formative latent variable
rather than a reflective latent variable. This was done because adverse childhood events can be
seen as risk factors that are not necessarily correlated with one another. However, they all
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contribute to the cumulative probability of developing a particular outcome (in our case an
increased investment in reproduction or somatic maintenance). For example, having been
exposed to the death of a parent, lower parental education or lower parental socioeconomic
status are three events that increase the probability of experiencing an adverse childhood envi-
ronment, but that might occur independently.
The reproduction-maintenance-trade-off was modeled by constructing a reflective latent
variable based on “number of children”, “age at first birth” (calculated from the birth year of
the respondent and the reported birth year of their first child) and “subjective health status”
(scale 1–5: the higher the score the better the respondents’ reported health). These items were
chosen because they approximate the reproduction-maintenance trade-off [1]. For example,
recent studies report that some health costs are induced by increased investment in reproduc-
tive functions positively associated to fertility–in both women (e.g., high number of pregnan-
cies, high parity) and men (e.g., high level of testosterone). These health costs include
increased production of pro-inflammatory cytokines, insulin resistance, increased production
of triglycerides and LDL cholesterol, increased oxidative stress, altered immune function, car-
dio-vascular diseases [66,75,87] and have long-lasting health correlates, including on people’s
lifespan, which has been shown to be well captured by self-reported health [88].
Cooperation was modeled by constructing a reflective latent variable. In articles using the
European Values Study and the World Values Survey [89,90], cooperation is often assessed
using questions tapping cooperative morality (e.g., the respondent’s opinion about claiming
government benefits to which you are not entitled; avoiding a fare on public transport; cheat-
ing on taxes if you have a chance). Such questions do not test actual cooperation, but rather
people’s moral judgments. Importantly, moral judgments are not systematically aligned with
actual behavior. For instance, individuals who claim that it is wrong to cheat on taxes may
actually cheat themselves. Individuals living in low trust societies are indeed more likely to
cheat because they think that others are cheating [91] and they are also more likely to be in
favor of harsh punishments for cheaters because they do not trust that cheating can be avoided
by means other than harsh punishments [37].
To address this problem, we chose to focus on respondents’ actual investment in collective
actions. We scanned the European Values Study to identify variables that had previously been
found to successfully predict real-life cooperation [33] and that tapped actual behaviors involv-
ing concrete costs and delayed benefits for the agent and benefits for others. Two sets of vari-
ables met our a priori defined criteria: how much someone volunteers (scale 0–15) and how
often someone participates in political actions that might benefit the community, without
receiving financial compensation (scale 0–5) (items are detailed in S2 Table). People who vol-
unteer or take part in political actions indeed incur concrete costs, including time and energy,
to engage in actions that benefit others. Furthermore, volunteering and political actions also
have delayed benefits for the actor. Volunteering, for example, is positively associated with
concern for social reputation or image [92] and is a means of obtaining human capital that will
yield returns in the labor market [93,94]. Political action, for example voting, has also been
shown to correlate with higher social reputation [95,96]. Although volunteering and political
action are limited in their own way (for instance, many cooperative interactions happen out-
side the activities described in these items), these items have the advantage of being the most
concrete instances of true investment in collective goods available in the European Values
Study. Volunteering was calculated by taking the sum of 15 separate items that indicate if
respondents volunteer for different groups (e.g., religious organizations, trade unions and
sport groups). Political action was calculated by taking the sum of five separate items that indi-
cate if respondents take part in different political actions (e.g., signing a petition, joining boy-
cotts and attending lawful demonstrations).
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2.1.3 Model specification and fit. First, the reproduction-maintenance trade-off was
regressed on childhood environmental adversity. Second, collective action was regressed on
the reproduction-maintenance trade-off and childhood environmental adversity. Third, child-
hood environmental adversity was modeled as a formative latent variable. These variables
need to be scaled for identification purposes by fixing the coefficient of one of the causal indi-
cators [70]. Childhood environmental adversity was scaled by setting the path from “parental
education” to 1. Fourth, the reflective latent variable reproduction-maintenance trade-off and
the reflective latent variable collective action were scaled by fixing their variance to 1. Fifth, the
correlation between the residual errors of “age at first birth” and “number of children” was
included in the model. The reason for this is that, all else being equal, the sooner you have chil-
dren, the more children you can have. This correlation is not captured by the latent variable
reproduction-maintenance trade-off and is therefore included separately; these two variables
indeed covary mechanically [70].
Hooper et al. [97] recommend determining model fit by using χ2, Comparative Fit Index
(CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual (SRMR). A good fit is assumed if the indices are close to the following values:
χ2 p-value > 0.05, CFI > 0.95, RMSEA p-value < 0.07 and SRMR< 0.08. It is important to
note however, that the large sample size of our study prevents us from interpreting χ2 as evi-
dence for a discrepancy between the sample and the model-implied covariance matrix. The
chi-square statistic is indeed known to be particularly sensitive to sample size, which can lead
models fitted on large samples to be systematically rejected [98]. Furthermore, the χ2 assumes
normality [99] and the deviation from normality characterizing some of our variables might
result in the rejection of the model even when the model is properly specified. Therefore, only
the scaled versions of the CFI, RMSEA and SRMR are reported, which eliminates the issues of
sample size dependency and non-normality of continuous and categorical data [100].
2.1.4 Covariates. Given that cooperation is affected by age, we included age as an auxiliary
variable to control for its effect on the collective action variables. Freund & Blanchard-Fields
[101], for example, found that older adults report valuing contributions to the public good
more positively and are more likely to behave altruistically than younger adults. Furthermore,
age is also used as an auxiliary variable to control for its effect on the “subjective health status”
variable and on the “number of children” variable. The reason for this is that, all else being
equal, the older you get the poorer your health is likely to be and the more children you are
likely to have.
Childhood environmental adversity and current environmental adversity are moderately
correlated [51]. Therefore, we ran an additional analysis which was not pre-registered where
we controlled for the effect of current adversity on the reproduction-maintenance trade-off
and collective action variables. Current adversity was modeled using the respondent’s current
income level (scale 1–10: the higher the score the lower the income level).
2.1.5 Analyses. We first carried out our analyses on the discovery sample; we then pre-
registered our analysis plan on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/642hd); finally, we
applied the pre-registered analyses on the replication sample. The results of the replication
sample are presented below. The results of the discovery sample are detailed in S1 Text; the sig-
nificance and direction of the key associations are consistent with the replication sample.
Although, two additional indicators for childhood environmental adversity reach significance:
“parents had problems making ends meet” and “death of mother”.
All statistical analyses were carried out in R 3.4.4 (https://www.r-project.org/) with R Studio
1.1.456. The structural equation model was fitted using the R package lavaan [102]. The
WLSMV estimator was used for its robustness to departures from normality [102].
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When data was missing, we conducted listwise deletions. Although our variables of interest
showed overall low percentages of missing responses (ranging from 0 to 13%), an additional
analysis was done on the replication sample with imputed data. The results of this analysis are
largely consistent with the results obtained using listwise deletions (see S2 Text). The main dif-
ference is that childhood environmental adversity is significantly–albeit weakly—associated
with increased adult involvement in collective action–a result that we will discuss in more
detail below.
For the mediation analyses the bootstrap method developed by Preacher & Hayes [103] was
used, which is recommended by MacKinnon et al. [104]. This is a non-parametric resampling
test. The main feature of this test is that it does not rely on the assumption of normality. Boot-
strapping estimates the upper limit and the lower limit of the confidence intervals of an indi-
rect effect. We computed bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (1000 bootstrap samples).
The direct effect, indirect effect and total effect can be found in S3 Text.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics and the correla-
tion matrix for the variables included in the structural equation model can be found in
Table 1.
2.2.2 Model fit. The scaled CFI value (0.900), the scaled RMSEA value (0.040) and the
scaled SRMR value (0.018) are fairly consistent with a close-fitting model. Therefore, the
approximate fit indices reveal no strong misspecification for this model.
2.2.3 Measurement model. The standardized regression weights can be found in Fig 1
(the full results can be found in S3 Table). Childhood environmental adversity is driven by two
main contributors: “parents had problems replacing things” (UnStd c = 2.37 (0.26), z = 9.01,
p< 0.001, Std c = 0.69) and “death of the father before age 16” (UnStd c = 1.65 (0.70), z = 2.37,
p< 0.05, Std c = 0.09). “Death of the mother before age 16” and “parents had problems mak-
ings ends meet” did not load significantly on childhood environmental adversity.
“Subjective health status” (UnStd c = -0.39 (0.02), z = -25.97, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.43) and
“age at first birth” (UnStd c = -1.60 (0.07), z = -24.63, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.33) loaded
Table 1. European Values Study descriptive statistics and correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Parental education -
(2) Parents problem making ends meet 0.28� -
(3) Parents problem replacing things 0.24� 0.71� -
(4) Death of father 0.07� 0.11� 0.10� -
(5) Death of mother 0.02� 0.01 0.01 0.03� -
(6) Health -0.16� -0.16� -0.18� -0.06� -0.02� -
(7) Age 1st birth -0.06� -0.08� -0.08� -0.02 -0.01 0.11� -
(8) Number of children 0.19� 0.10� 0.07� 0.02 0.03� -0.08� -0.18� -
(9) Volunteering -0.03� -0.02� -0.03� -0.01 0,00 0.1� 0.05� 0.04� -
(10) Political action -0.1� -0.07� -0.11� -0.02� 0,00 0.15� 0.13� -0.01 0.12� -
(11) Age 0.31� 0.16� 0.13� 0.11� 0.05� -0.33� 0.1� 0.24� 0,00 -0.01 -
Mean 5.49 2.40 2.34 0.05 0.02 3.56 25.18 2.21 0.38 0.61 51.96
SD 1.99 1.17 1.17 0.22 0.13 0.96 5.18 1.12 1.21 0.96 15.00
Range 1–8 1–4 1–4 0–1 0–1 1–5 12–83 1–13 0–15 0–5 18–108
� p < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715.t001
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significantly on the reproduction-maintenance trade-off. The pattern of covariation follows
our predictions: poorer reported health and a younger age at first child’s birth. “Number of
children” did not load significantly on the reproduction-maintenance trade-off. However,
inspection of the estimated covariance shows that “number of children” is not independent
but covaries with “age at first birth” in the expected way (UnStd c = -1.15 (0.04), z = -31.63,
p< 0.001, Std c = -0.22), specifically a higher age at first child’s birth correlates with lower
number of children, an observation that is in line with existing findings [70]. Hence, the repro-
duction-maintenance trade-off is fairly consistent with prior studies [69,70].
“Volunteering” (UnStd c = 0.34 (0.02), z = 17.12, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.52) and “political
action” (UnStd c = 0.40 (0.03), z = 14.90, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.61) loaded significantly on the
collective action latent variable, whose greater values indicate higher investments in both vol-
unteering and political activities.
2.2.4 Structural model. Fig 1 shows that the direct effect of childhood environment
adversity is significantly–albeit weakly–associated with decreased adult involvement in collec-
tive action (UnStd c = -0.03 (0.01), z = -3.50, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.08). This implies that an
adverse childhood environment is associated with less investment in collective actions later in
life, relatively independently of variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off.
Furthermore, an adverse childhood environment is associated with variations in individuals’
reproduction-maintenance-trade-off (UnStd c = 0.08 (0.01), z = 10.46, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.29),
specifically an increased investment in reproduction and a decreased investment in somatic
maintenance. The reproduction-maintenance trade-off is itself associated with lower adult
involvement in collective action (UnStd c = -1.07 (0.10), z = -10.87, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.73).
In line with our first hypothesis, a significant part of the effect of childhood environmental
adversity on adult involvement in collective action is mediated by the reproduction-mainte-
nance trade-off (indirect effect: UnStd c = -0.0027 (0.0004), bootstrapped ci lower = -0.0035,
bootstrapped ci upper = -0.0020, z = -6.92, p< 0.001).
The above mentioned effects remain stable after the inclusion of the respondent’s current
adversity as an additional covariate (scaled CFI = 0.897; scaled RMSEA = 0.042; scaled
SRMR = 0.017), and the magnitude of key parameters stayed significant and in the expected
direction (the full results can be found in S4 Table).
Given that the mediation effect is strong, the direct effect of childhood environmental
adversity on collective action is to be interpreted with caution. Our analyses show that it is
indeed a small and unstable effect, which reverses in the dataset that includes imputed data
(UnStd c = 0.04 (0.02), z = 2.23, p< 0.05, Std c = 0.13). To confirm that this coefficient insta-
bility can be attributed to the presence of a mediator capturing a large part of the effect, we ran
an additional model on the replication sample with imputed data, but without the mediating
variable (i.e., reproduction-maintenance trade-off). This analysis revealed that adverse child-
hood environments are indeed associated with decreased collective action (UnStd c = -0.07
(0.01), z = -7.09, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.21).
The other regression coefficients are larger and more stable across analyses and datasets
(i.e., the dataset implementing listwise deletions and the imputed dataset). This is the case for
the regression between childhood environmental adversity and the reproduction-maintenance
trade-off (listwise deletions UnStd c = 0.08 (0.01), z = 10.46, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.29; imputed
data UnStd c = 0.07 (0.01), z = 6.92, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.39), for the regression between the
reproduction-maintenance trade-off and collective action (listwise deletions UnStd c = -1.07
(0.10), z = -10.87, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.73; imputed data UnStd c = -1.50 (0.34), z = -4.42,
p< 0.001, Std c = -0.88), as well as for the mediation effect (listwise deletions indirect effect:
UnStd c = -0.0027 (0.0004), bootstrapped ci lower = -0.0035, bootstrapped ci upper = -0.0020,
z = -6.92, p< 0.001; imputed data indirect effect: UnStd c = -0.0023 (0.0004), bootstrapped ci
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lower = -0.0030, bootstrapped ci upper = -0.0016, z = -6.64, p< 0.001). Overall, these results
converge on the idea that the relationship between childhood environmental adversity and col-
lective action is largely conditional on the reproduction-maintenance trade-off.
Finally, the range for “age at first child’s birth” is from 12 to 83 years old. This range is theo-
retically possible but unlikely (especially for women). We suspect that some of these data
points are in fact entry errors. However, we kept the full sample for two reasons: first, it is
impossible to tease apart entry errors from true late first births and second, very few individu-
als reported to have had their first birth at a later age (only 14 women out of 17.087). To ensure
that the inclusion of these 14 participants did not alter our results we ran the model again with-
out these participants and found the same overall pattern.
2.2.5 Conclusions. Our prediction was that people who grew up in adverse environments
invest less in collective actions later in life and that this effect is mediated by modulations of
the reproduction-maintenance trade-off. Data from the European Values Study partly confirm
this hypothesis and show that the association between childhood environmental adversity and
Fig 1. European Values Study standardized parameter values estimated by the structural equation model. Significant paths at the 5% level are
represented with a continuous arrow.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715.g001
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adult involvement in collective action is partly mediated by variations in individuals’ repro-
duction-maintenance-trade-off.
3. Study 2: Current adversity and collective action in the World
Values Survey
We then had the objective of replicating the pattern of associations found in study 1 on an
independent sample extracted from the World Values Survey dataset [105]. The World Values
Survey has relied on social scientists since 1981 to collect data from large representative sam-
ples of the populations from almost 100 European and non-European countries. In this study,
we focused on the fourth wave (1999–2004) for two reasons: first, it includes non-European
countries; second, unlike the other waves, the fourth wave includes the same collective action
variables as the ones included in the European Values Study sample analyzed in study 1.
It is worth acknowledging that using the World Values Survey fourth wave also comes with
several limitations. First, unlike the European Values Study fourth wave, the World Values
Survey fourth wave (and the other waves as well) does not contain any data about the respon-
dents’ age at first reproduction. Therefore, the reproduction-maintenance trade-off can only
be modeled on two indicators: the respondents’ number of children and their self-reported
health status. Nevertheless, as we point in section 2.1.2 of the present article, the existing litera-
ture provides substantial evidence that the number of children and the self-reported health sta-
tus can be considered as fairly good proxies for the reproduction-maintenance trade-off. The
second limitation is that the World Values Survey fourth wave contains no data on the respon-
dents’ childhood environment. We therefore focus on respondents’ current income as an indi-
cator of the level of adversity they are currently exposed to. This choice is primarily motivated
by a number of studies showing that income correlates with almost all forms of morbidity and
mortality [2–4], such that economically deprived people also experience greater exposure to
disability and death. The second motivation comes from the fact that economic status in adult-
hood generally correlates with economic status in childhood [106,107].
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Respondents. 59.030 respondents living in 40 different countries are included in
wave 4 of the World Values Survey. However, some respondents could not be included in our
analyses. First, one of the variables (i.e., number of children) used to model the reproduction-
maintenance-trade-off is only informing for respondents with children. The reason is that peo-
ple who do not have children now fall into three categories: (1) people who do not have chil-
dren yet but will do so in the future, (2) people who do not have children yet and will choose
not to do so in the future and (3) people who do not have children yet but would like to and
can’t. Since we have no way of distinguishing these three groups, we focused on the people
who do have children, which left us with the 41.799 respondents who report having children
(this also makes it consistent with the first study, where we also removed respondents without
children). Second, we removed countries for which the collective action variables had not been
filled out, which reduced the dataset to 25.670 respondents living in 27 different countries. We
randomly split this sample into a discovery subsample (12.962 respondents) and a replication
subsample (12.708 respondents). In both subsamples, we excluded respondents with too much
missing data (the criterion was set to more than two standard deviations from a respondent’s
respective subsample mean) which led to 12.083 respondents for the discovery sample and
11.888 respondents for the replication sample. The final discovery sample after listwise dele-
tions included 10.829 respondents (females: N = 5.633; mean age = 45 ± 15 sd; mean number
of respondents per country = 417 ± 150 sd) and the final replication sample after listwise
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deletions included 10.617 respondents (females: N = 5.589; mean age = 45 ± 14 sd; mean num-
ber of respondents per country = 408 ± 157 sd). The final replication sample after listwise dele-
tions consists of 26 countries (descriptive statistics for each country are detailed in S5 Table).
3.1.2 Variables. We selected variables tapping three constructs: current adversity, the
reproduction-maintenance-trade-off and collective action. Respondents’ current adversity was
represented by their current income level (scale 1–10: the higher the score the lower the
income level) [2–4,51].
The reproduction-maintenance-trade-off was modeled by constructing a reflective latent
variable based on “number of children” and “subjective health status” (scale 1–5: the higher
the score the better the respondents’ reported health).
The reflective latent construct “collective action” was estimated from the very same indica-
tors as in study 1. The only difference is that scores in “volunteering” and “political action”
were calculated on the basis of 14 and 4 items respectively (instead of 15 and 5 items in study
1, respectively) (items are detailed in S6 Table).
3.1.3 Model specification and fit. The model’s structure was the same as the one specified
in study 1, with two notable differences. First, childhood environmental adversity was replaced
by current adversity. Second, “age at first birth” is no longer an indicator of the latent variable
reproduction-maintenance-trade-off. Age was again used as an auxiliary variable to control for
its effect on the collective action variables and “subjective health status” variable and “number
of children” variable. Model fit was determined in the same manner as in study 1.
3.1.4 Analyses. We first carried out our analyses on the discovery sample; we then pre-
registered our analysis plan on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/37bs2/); finally, we
applied the pre-registered analyses on the replication sample. The results of the replication
sample are presented below (the results of the discovery sample are detailed in S4 Text; the sig-
nificance and direction of the key associations are consistent with the replication sample).
When data was missing, we conducted listwise deletions (as in study 1). Although our vari-
ables of interest showed overall low percentages of missing responses (ranging from 0 to 13%),
an additional analysis was done on the replication sample with imputed data. The results of
this analysis are consistent with the results obtained using listwise deletions (see S5 Text).
All statistical analyses and the method for mediation analyses were similar to those reported
in study 1. The direct effect, indirect effect and total effect can be found in S6 Text.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics and the correla-
tion matrix for the variables included in the structural equation model can be found in
Table 2.
3.2.2 Model fit. The scaled CFI value (0.960), the scaled RMSEA value (0.047) and the
scaled SRMR value (0.018) are consistent with a close-fitting model. Therefore, the approxi-
mate fit indices reveal no strong misspecification for this model.
3.2.3 Measurement model. The standardized regression weights can be found in Fig 2
(the full results can be found in S7 Table). “Subjective health status” (UnStd c = -0.15 (0.03),
z = -4.38, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.24) and “number of children” (UnStd c = 0.22 (0.05), z = 4.39,
p< 0.001, Std c = 0.17) loaded significantly on the reproduction-maintenance-trade-off. As in
study 1, the pattern of covariation follows our predictions: poorer reported health and higher
number of children. Hence, the reproduction-maintenance-trade-off is consistent with prior
studies [69,70].
“Volunteering” (UnStd c = 0.20 (0.04), z = 5.69, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.12) and “political
action” (UnStd c = 0.63 (0.16), z = 4.01, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.75) loaded significantly on the
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collective action latent variable, whose greater values indicate higher investments in political
activities and, to a lesser extent, higher investments in volunteering activities.
3.2.4 Structural model. Fig 2 shows that the direct effect of current adversity on adult
involvement in collective action is not significant (UnStd c = 0.12 (0.11), z = 1.12, p = 0.26, Std
Table 2. World Values Survey descriptive statistics and correlations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Current adversity -
(2) Health -0.18� -
(3) Number of children 0.13� -0.09� -
(4) Volunteering -0.04� 0.03� 0.06� -
(5) Political action -0.13� 0.06� -0.05� 0.09� -
(6) Age 0.03 -0.21� 0.24� -0.05� 0.06� -
Mean 6.56 3.78 2.93 1.03 0.57 44.53
SD 2.35 0.87 1.78 1.88 0.94 14.45
Range 1–10 1–5 1–8 0–14 0–4 16–98
� p < 0.05.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715.t002
Fig 2. World Values Survey standardized parameter values estimated by the structural equation model. Significant paths at the 5% level are
represented with a continuous arrow.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715.g002
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c = 0.25). Furthermore, more current adversity is associated with variations in individuals’
reproduction-maintenance trade-off (UnStd c = 0.42 (0.10), z = 4.36, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.70),
specifically an increased investment in reproduction and a decreased investment in somatic
maintenance. The reproduction-maintenance-trade-off is itself associated with lower adult
involvement in collective action (UnStd c = -0.48 (0.19), z = -2.49, p< 0.05, Std c = -0.60). In
line with our second hypothesis, the effect of current adversity on adult involvement in collec-
tive action is mediated by the reproduction-maintenance trade-off (indirect effect: UnStd c =
-0.003 (0.001), bootstrapped ci lower = -0.004, bootstrapped ci upper = -0.001, z = -2.67,
p< 0.01).
Despite the fact that the association pattern reported above is identical to the one found
with the European Values Study (EVS) data, one should note that the effects are smaller (by
comparing the z-values). This is the case for the regression between environmental adversity
and collective action (EVS UnStd c = -0.03 (0.01), z = -3.50, p< 0.001, Std c = -0.08; WVS
UnStd c = 0.12 (0.11), z = 1.12, p = 0.26, Std c = 0.25), between environmental adversity and
the reproduction-maintenance trade-off (EVS UnStd c = 0.08 (0.01), z = 10.46, p< 0.001, Std
c = 0.29; WVS UnStd c = 0.42 (0.10), z = 4.36, p< 0.001, Std c = 0.70), between the reproduc-
tion-maintenance trade-off and collective action (EVS UnStd c = -1.07 (0.10), z = -10.87,
p< 0.001, Std c = -0.73; WVS UnStd c = -0.48 (0.19), z = -2.49, p< 0.05, Std c = -0.60) as well
as for the mediation effect (EVS indirect effect: UnStd c = -0.0027 (0.0004), bootstrapped ci
lower = -0.0035, bootstrapped ci upper = -0.0020, z = -6.92, p< 0.001; WVS indirect effect:
UnStd c = -0.003 (0.001), bootstrapped ci lower = -0.004, bootstrapped ci upper = -0.001, z =
-2.67, p< 0.01).
3.2.5 Conclusions. Our prediction was that people who currently live in adverse environ-
ments invest less in collective action and that this effect is mediated by modulations of the
reproduction-maintenance trade-off. Data from the World Values Survey confirm this
hypothesis and show that the association between current adversity and adult involvement in
collective action is mediated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off.
4. Discussion
The present study replicates existing research linking adverse environments in childhood and
adulthood with decreased investment in adult cooperation [33,34,36–38], and finds that this
association is mediated by variations in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance-trade-off. Fur-
thermore, it adds to the consistent pattern of results (i.e., a relationship between adverse envi-
ronments and decreased cooperation) found by existing studies that use self-reported
questionnaires to measure cooperation [33,34].
Even though the findings reported above are consistent with the existing literature, it is
important that we highlight several limitations. First, we used people’s involvement in collec-
tive actions as a proxy for cooperation but cooperation obviously encompasses more than col-
lective action behaviors. The reason we chose these items is that, unlike self-reported attitudes
about cooperative morals often used as proxies for cooperation in other survey studies [90],
these were the only variables that met our a priori defined criteria (actual behaviors involving
concrete costs and delayed benefits for the agent and have benefits for others that had previ-
ously been successful in predicting real-life cooperation) in the European Values Study and
the World Values Survey. However, people might cooperate in different ways than in large-
scale collective action. For example, they might actively cooperate within more restricted social
networks centered around kinship [108]. Thus, it remains an open question whether people
cooperate less under adverse conditions in the broadest sense or simply invest less in collective
actions.
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Second, our goal was to investigate if part of the variability in people’s involvement in col-
lective action was mediated by differences in individuals’ reproduction-maintenance-trade-
off. Although the reproduction-maintenance-trade-off is well captured in the World Values
Survey model, it is less well captured in the European Values Study model. Specifically “num-
ber of children” is not significantly correlated with the reproduction-maintenance trade-off.
This may reflect the fact that the reproduction-maintenance trade-off indicators are influenced
by multiple causes beyond the reproduction-maintenance trade-off itself, including cultural
factors like contraceptives. Such cultural factors might account for the fact that “number of
children” is not significantly correlated with respondents’ reproduction-maintenance trade-off
in the European Values Study [109].
Third, the large sample sizes used in our studies raise the possibility that the statistically sig-
nificant associations reported are primarily due to high statistical power. Therefore, the report-
ing of p-values is less informative. Standardized regression coefficients can be used as an effect
size index [110]. Standardized regression coefficients refer to how many standard deviations
the dependent variable will change per a standard deviation increase in the independent vari-
able, holding all other variables constant. Standardized regression coefficients can be inter-
preted similar to correlations, where<0.2 is considered a weak effect, between 0.2 and 0.5 as a
moderate effect and>0.5 as a strong effect [111]. Looking at our standardized path coeffi-
cients; the effect between adversity and collective action is weak (EVS Std c = -0.08; WVS not
significant), the effect between adversity and the reproduction maintenance trade-off is mod-
erate for the European Values Study and strong for the World Values Survey (EVS Std
c = 0.29; WVS Std c = 0.70) and the effect between the reproduction maintenance trade-off
and collective action is strong (EVS Std c = -0.73; WVS Std c = -0.60).
Fourth, it is important to note that life-history theory has been hotly debated for theoretical,
empirical and methodological reasons in recent years [112–116]. Of particular relevance to
this paper is the debate questioning whether life-history theory can be applied to explain indi-
vidual differences in humans. Life-history theory was initially developed to explain differences
between species [117] and later applied to individual differences in humans by invoking
genetic factors, early environment conditions, or phenotypic plasticity [1,73,77,118], the latter
two concepts being central to the present paper. One criticism laid out by Zietsch & Sidari
[116] is that the processes that create between species trait covariation (i.e., Darwinian evolu-
tion) and within species trait covariation (e.g., developmental plasticity) are fundamentally dif-
ferent. In response to this, Del Giudice [119] has argued that the two processes can in fact be
functionally related. He proposed the term “ecological gambit”, where trade-offs in the context
of life-history strategies form the basis for the functional link between population and individ-
ual differences, as is the case in our analyses focusing on the reproduction-maintenance trade-
off. In addition, there is evidence that phenotypic plasticity is the dominant source of inter-
individual and inter-population variation in reproductive traits and associated health costs
[66,120].
More generally, the correlational nature of our data hinders the possibility of producing
inferences about the causal role of adverse environments on cooperation. For example, it is
possible that the relationship between environmental adversity and cooperation is reversed:
adverse environments might be associated with lower cooperation because individuals who
cooperate less are less likely to do well in life and therefore more likely to end up living in a
adverse environment. This alternative is plausible albeit a little harder to reconcile with the fact
that we also found an association between an adverse childhood environment and adult coop-
eration. Another possibility is that there is an unknown variable that influences both environ-
mental adversity and cooperation. Finally, the relationship between environmental adversity
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and cooperation might not be monotonic. For example, Lazarus [121] has proposed that coop-
eration may be an inverted-U function of environmental adversity.
One way to demonstrate the causal effect of environmental adversity on cooperation would
be to experimentally manipulate acute stress [13], for example by administering hydrocorti-
sone (a synthetic form of cortisol). Using this methodology, Riis-Vestergaard et al. [122] found
that administering hydrocortisone increases temporal discounting over the short term.
Another possibility to induce stress is to expose people to mortality cues [51], e.g. in the form
of news articles stating that in the local area there is an increase in violence. However, it is
important to note that there are large differences between the effects of acute stress and
chronic stress [123]. For example, acute stress has been found to increase physical arousal,
learning, motivated behavior and sensation seeking. By contrast, chronic stress has been found
to impair attentional control, behavioral flexibility and it can promote anxiety, depression and
learned helplessness.
Another option to identify causal relationships is to analyze longitudinal data involving
exogenous shocks to the individual’s environment (e.g., sudden increase of income or in con-
trast famine, war, etc.). There have been a handful of longitudinal studies testing the effect of
stress during childhood and social behavior in adulthood using exogenous shocks of positive
or negative income on different behavioral outcomes. These studies have shown that higher
levels of income tend to make individuals more ‘agreeable’ and more trustful [27,124] while
higher levels of violence during childhood make people more antisocial and more violent
[125,126]. One of the most noteworthy pieces of research in this area is a quasi-experimental
study led by Akee et al. [124]. In this study, American Indian children were exposed to a posi-
tive income shock following the opening of a casino that decided to allocate part of its revenue
to Cherokee households. Particularly interesting is that the increase in income led to an
increase in agreeableness, which correlates with cooperation and unselfishness [127,128].
Hence, at least part of the effects of childhood environmental adversity on cooperation might
capture long-term plastic responses to the environment.
It should be noted that our results are compatible with a range of mechanisms. The stan-
dard mechanism put forward in the literature (and in our introduction) is that cooperation is
adaptively reduced in adverse environments because individuals have a shorter life expectancy
and should therefore be more short-term oriented [47]. However, the idea that people focus
more on the present because they have a higher probability of dying at age 60 instead of age 80
is problematic. Why should this affect their interest in cooperation today? The fact that some-
one is alive at age 60 or age 80 indeed has little impact on his or her probability of being alive
tomorrow [129,130]. A recent theoretical model demonstrates that waiting costs (i.e., the cost
paid by an individual even when the benefits are guaranteed) are another mechanism by
which adverse environments can be associated with higher discount rates [131], and therefore
decreased cooperation. When an individual has to choose between obtaining a resource imme-
diately or a larger resource later she must take into account all the benefits she could have
earned, during the delay, by wisely using this resource. Resources can be transformed into cap-
ital which allows individuals to better exploit their environment. When an individual chooses
a delayed resource over an immediate one, she therefore renounces all the benefits this supple-
mentary capital would have generated during that delay. These forgone benefits are indepen-
dent of mortality or other collection risk. They are paid even if the individual is certain to
obtain the resource eventually. They constitute the waiting cost per se. The more an individual
can gain by investing new resources wisely into capital, the higher the waiting cost. The models
shows that individuals who have already accumulated a lot of personal capital, and are high up
on their pyramid of needs, should be relatively patient because each supplementary unit of
capital makes a small difference to them anyway, whereas those who have accumulated little
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and are still at the bottom of their pyramid of needs should have a short time horizon as each
additional resource can make a big difference to them.
Another mechanism by which environmental adversity can have an effect on cooperation is
risk management. For example, Amir et al. [39] put forward an uncertainty management per-
spective, where adverse environments are associated with risk averse, present-oriented and
more cooperative preferences. Although, they do not specifically test whether risk is a mediator
between environmental adversity and cooperation. Even in the uncertainty management per-
spective proposed by Amir et al. [39], adverse environments are associated with a present-ori-
entation, which is in line with the framework of our study. Amir et al. [39] see cooperation as a
form of risk pooling which would reduce uncertainty. Therefore, in adverse and uncertain
environments, this would be associated with increased cooperation. We fully agree that in
adverse environments people will want to reduce uncertainty, but we are not entirely con-
vinced that the primary means to achieve this is increased cooperation. One possibility is that
this might be the case in specific contexts, for example, where population size is low and where
the likelihood of interacting with a third party outside the kinship community is small. How-
ever, the pattern might be reversed in places where the population size is larger and where the
likelihood of interacting with non-kin increases, because the likelihood of being cheated also
increases as a result [132–134], and this risk might further increase in adverse conditions. In
these environments, trusting other people less and cooperating less can be viewed as a means
to reduce uncertainty, a view which is in contradiction with Amir et al.’s findings [39], but
which fits a large set of work in the social sciences [81,83,135] as well as our own results. We
think that risk management strategies in the context of social behaviors is an interesting topic
for further research.
Whether cooperation is decreased or increased in adverse environments is still debated.
The present study contributes to this debate by reporting two pre-registered studies applying
structural equation models to test this relationship on large-scale datasets (the European
Values Study and the World Values Survey). The results show that adverse environments in
childhood and adulthood are associated with decreased investment in adult cooperation. Fur-
thermore, the channel through which this relationship arises is also unclear. We proposed that
this relationship is mediated by a present bias at the psychological level, which is embodied in
the reproduction-maintenance trade-off at the biological level. We indeed found that the rela-
tionship between environmental adversity and cooperation is mediated by individuals’ repro-
duction-maintenance trade-off.
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health: An evolutionary perspective. The Lancet. 2017 Jul 29; 390(10093):510–20. https://doi.org/10.
1016/S0140-6736(17)30573-1
67. Nettle D. Dying young and living fast: Variation in life history across English neighborhoods. Behav
Ecol. 2010 Mar 1; 21(2):387–95. https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arp202
68. Promislow DEL, Harvey PH. Living fast and dying young: A comparative analysis of life-history varia-
tion among mammals. J Zool. 1990; 220(3):417–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7998.1990.
tb04316.x
PLOS ONE Environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715 July 30, 2020 20 / 23
69. Brumbach BH, Figueredo AJ, Ellis BJ. Effects of harsh and unpredictable environments in adoles-
cence on development of life history strategies. Hum Nat. 2009; 20(1):25–51. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12110-009-9059-3 PMID: 20634914
70. Mell H, Safra L, Algan Y, Baumard N, Chevallier C. Childhood environmental harshness predicts coor-
dinated health and reproductive strategies: A cross-sectional study of a nationally representative sam-
ple from France. Evol Hum Behav. 2018 Jan 1; 39(1):1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.
2017.08.006
71. Nettle D. Flexibility in reproductive timing in human females: Integrating ultimate and proximate expla-
nations. Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci. 2011 Feb 12; 366(1563):357–65. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.
2010.0073 PMID: 21199840
72. Bribiescas RG, Ellison PT. How hormones mediate trade-offs in human health and disease. In Evolu-
tion in Health and Disease. Stearns Stephen C. and Koella Jacob C., eds. Pp. 77–93. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. In 2008.
73. Del Giudice M, Gangestad SW, Kaplan HS. Life history theory and evolutionary psychology. Handb
Evol Psychol Vol 1 Found. 2015;88–114.
74. Ryan CP, Hayes MG, Lee NR, McDade TW, Jones MJ, Kobor MS, et al. Reproduction predicts shorter
telomeres and epigenetic age acceleration among young adult women. Sci Rep. 2018 Jul 23; 8(1):1–
9. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-17765-5 PMID: 29311619
75. Ziomkiewicz A, Sancilio A, Galbarczyk A, Klimek M, Jasienska G, Bribiescas RG. Evidence for the
cost of reproduction in humans: High lifetime reproductive effort is associated with greater oxidative
stress in post-menopausal women. PLOS ONE. 2016 Jan 13; 11(1):e0145753. https://doi.org/10.
1371/journal.pone.0145753 PMID: 26761206
76. Hughes K, Bellis MA, Hardcastle KA, Sethi D, Butchart A, Mikton C, et al. The effect of multiple
adverse childhood experiences on health: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Lancet Public
Health. 2017 Aug 1; 2(8):e356–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2468-2667(17)30118-4 PMID: 29253477
77. Belsky J, Steinberg L, Draper P. Childhood experience, interpersonal development, and reproductive
strategy: An evolutionary theory of socialization. Child Dev. 1991; 62(4):647–670. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1467-8624.1991.tb01558.x PMID: 1935336
78. Belsky J, Steinberg L, Houts RM, Halpern-Felsher BL. The development of reproductive strategy in
females: Early maternal harshness! earlier menarche! increased sexual risk taking. Dev Psychol.
2010; 46(1):120. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015549 PMID: 20053011
79. Belsky J, Schlomer GL, Ellis BJ. Beyond cumulative risk: Distinguishing harshness and unpredictabil-
ity as determinants of parenting and early life history strategy. Dev Psychol. 2012; 48(3):662. https://
doi.org/10.1037/a0024454 PMID: 21744948
80. Frankenhuis WE, Gergely G, Watson JS. Infants may use contingency analysis to estimate environ-
mental states: An evolutionary, life-history perspective. Child Dev Perspect. 2013; 7(2):115–20.
https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12024
81. Guiso L, Sapienza P, Zingales L. Does culture affect economic outcomes? J Econ Perspect. 2006
Jun; 20(2):23–48. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.20.2.23
82. Norris P, Inglehart R. Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge University
Press; 2004.
83. Ortiz-Ospina E, Roser M. Trust. Published online at OurWorldInData.org; 2019. https://
ourworldindata.org/trust
84. Delton AW, Cosmides L, Guemo M, Robertson TE, Tooby J. The psychosemantics of free riding: Dis-
secting the architecture of a moral concept. J Pers Soc Psychol. 2012; 102(6):1252–70. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0027026 PMID: 22268815
85. Price ME, Cosmides L, Tooby J. Punitive sentiment as an anti-free rider psychological device. Evol
Hum Behav. 2002 May 1; 23(3):203–31. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1090-5138(01)00093-9
86. European Values Study longitudinal data file 1981–2008 (EVS 1981–2008). 2015;(EVS. GESIS data
archive, cologne. ZA4804 data file version 3.0.0.).
87. McDade TW. The ecologies of human immune function. Annu Rev Anthropol. 2005; 34(1):495–521.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120348
88. Kington R, Lillard L, Rogowski J. Reproductive history, socioeconomic status, and self-reported health
status of women aged 50 years or older. Am J Public Health. 1997 Jan 1; 87(1):33–7. https://doi.org/
10.2105/ajph.87.1.33 PMID: 9065223
89. Atkinson QD, Bourrat P. Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural
policing in human cooperation. Evol Hum Behav. 2011; 32(1):41–49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
evolhumbehav.2010.07.008
PLOS ONE Environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715 July 30, 2020 21 / 23
90. Weeden J, Kurzban R. What predicts religiosity? A multinational analysis of reproductive and coopera-
tive morals. Evol Hum Behav. 2013 Nov 1; 34(6):440–5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.
2013.08.006
91. Schroeder KB, Pepper GV, Nettle D. Local norms of cheating and the cultural evolution of crime and
punishment: A study of two urban neighborhoods. PeerJ. 2014 Jul 1; 2:e450. https://doi.org/10.7717/
peerj.450 PMID: 25071983
92. Carpenter J, Myers CK. Why volunteer? Evidence on the role of altruism, image, and incentives. J
Public Econ. 2010 Dec 1; 94(11):911–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.007
93. Menchik PL, Weisbrod BA. Volunteer labor supply. J Public Econ. 1987 Mar 1; 32(2):159–83. https://
doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(87)90010-7
94. Ziemek S. Economic analysis of volunteers’ motivations—A cross-country study. J Socio-Econ. 2006
Jun 1; 35(3):532–55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.064
95. Ali SN, Lin C. Why people vote: Ethical motives and social incentives. Am Econ J Microecon. 2013
May; 5(2):73–98. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.2.73
96. Gerber AS, Huber GA, Doherty D, Dowling CM. Why people vote: Estimating the social returns to vot-
ing. Br J Polit Sci. 2016 Apr; 46(2):241–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000271
97. Hooper D, Coughlan J, Mullen M. Structural equation modelling: Guidelines for determining model fit.
Electron J Bus Res Methods. 2008; 6(1):53–60. https://doi.org/10.21427/D7CF7R
98. Schermelleh-Engel K, Moosbrugger H, Müller H. Evaluating the fit of structural equation models: Tests
of significance and descriptive goodness-offit measures. Methods Psychol Res. 2003; 8(2):23–74.
99. McIntosh CN. Rethinking fit assessment in structural equation modelling: A commentary and elabora-
tion on Barrett (2007). Personal Individ Differ. 2007 May 1; 42(5):859–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
paid.2006.09.020
100. Kline RB. Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, Fourth Edition. Guilford Publica-
tions; 2015. 553 p.
101. Freund AM, Blanchard-Fields F. Age-related differences in altruism across adulthood: Making per-
sonal financial gain versus contributing to the public good. Dev Psychol. 2014; 50(4):1125–36. https://
doi.org/10.1037/a0034491 PMID: 24059256
102. Rosseel Y. Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. J Stat Softw. 2012; 48(2):1–36.
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v048.i02
103. Preacher KJ, Hayes AF. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect
effects in multiple mediator models. Behav Res Methods. 2008 Aug 1; 40(3):879–91. https://doi.org/
10.3758/brm.40.3.879 PMID: 18697684
104. MacKinnon DP, Lockwood CM, Williams J. Confidence limits for the indirect effect: Distribution of the
product and resampling methods. Multivar Behav Res. 2004 Jan 1; 39(1):99–128. https://doi.org/10.
1207/s15327906mbr3901_4 PMID: 20157642
105. Inglehart R, Haerpfer C, Moreno A, Welzel C, Kizilova K, Diez-Medrano J, et al. World Values Survey:
All rounds-country-pooled datafile version. Madr JD Syst Inst. 2014.
106. Charles KK, Hurst E. The correlation of wealth across generations. J Polit Econ. 2003 Dec 1; 111
(6):1155–82. https://doi.org/10.1086/378526
107. Fagereng A, Mogstad M, Ronning M. Why do wealthy parents have wealthy children?. Rochester,
NY: Social Science Research Network; 2018 Feb Report No.: ID 3339614. https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3339614
108. Fukuyama F. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press Paper-
backs; 1995.
109. Colleran H. The cultural evolution of fertility decline. Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci. 2016; 371
(1692):20150152. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0152 PMID: 27022079
110. Nieminen P, Lehtiniemi H, Vähäkangas K, Huusko A, Rautio A. Standardised regression coefficient as
an effect size index in summarising findings in epidemiological studies. Epidemiology, Biostatistics
and Public Health. 2013; 10(4). https://doi.org/10.2427/8854
111. Acock AC. A gentle introduction to Stata. College Station. Texas: Stata Press; 2014.
112. Baldini R. Harsh environments and “fast” human life histories: What does the theory say? bioRxiv.
2015 Feb 17;014647. https://doi.org/10.1101/014647
113. Fisher AJ, Medaglia JD, Jeronimus BF. Lack of group-to-individual generalizability is a threat to
human subjects research. Proc Natl Acad Sci. 2018 Jul 3; 115(27):E6106–15. https://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1711978115 PMID: 29915059
114. Mathot KJ, Frankenhuis WE. Models of pace-of-life syndromes (POLS): A systematic review. Behav
Ecol Sociobiol. 2018 Feb 20; 72(3):41. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00265-018-2459-9
PLOS ONE Environmental adversity is associated with lower investment in collective actions
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236715 July 30, 2020 22 / 23
115. Nettle D, Frankenhuis WE. The evolution of life-history theory: A bibliometric analysis of an interdisci-
plinary research area. Proc R Soc B Biol Sci. 2019 Mar 27; 286(1899):20190040. https://doi.org/10.
1098/rspb.2019.0040 PMID: 30914012
116. Zietsch BP, Sidari MJ. A critique of life history approaches to human trait covariation. Evol Hum
Behav. 2019 Jun 8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2019.05.007
117. Pianka ER. On r- and K-Selection. Am Nat. 1970 Nov 1; 104(940):592–7. https://doi.org/10.1086/
282697
118. Figueredo AJ, Vásquez G, Brumbach BH, Schneider SMR, Sefcek JA, Tal IR, et al. Consilience and
life history theory: From genes to brain to reproductive strategy. Dev Rev. 2006 Jun 1; 26(2):243–75.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2006.02.002
119. Del Giudice M. Rethinking the fast-slow continuum of individual differences. PsyArXiv. 2019. https://
doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/4uhz8
120. Pettay JE, Kruuk LEB, Jokela J, Lummaa V. Heritability and genetic constraints of life-history trait evo-
lution in preindustrial humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci. 2005 Feb 22; 102(8):2838–43. https://doi.org/10.
1073/pnas.0406709102 PMID: 15701704
121. Lazarus J. Cooperation in adversity: An evolutionary approach. Glob Discourse. 2017 Oct 2; 7
(4):571–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2017.1402426
122. Riis-Vestergaard MI, van Ast V, Cornelisse S, Joëls M, Haushofer J. The effect of hydrocortisone
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